{"id":1778,"date":"2026-02-11T14:35:47","date_gmt":"2026-02-11T14:35:47","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/d.sheep-mine.ts.net\/?p=1778"},"modified":"2026-02-11T14:35:47","modified_gmt":"2026-02-11T14:35:47","slug":"128209136-cms","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/d.sheep-mine.ts.net\/?p=1778","title":{"rendered":"Bangladesh to vote tomorrow: What’s at stake for India, Pakistan and China – The Times of India"},"content":{"rendered":"


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\"Bangladesh<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/section>\n<\/div><\/div>\n<\/div>\n

After months of violence, street protests and political upheaval, Bangladesh now faces its moment of reckoning. What began in July 2024 as a student agitation over public sector job quotas quickly spiralled into a nationwide revolt against Sheikh Hasina\u2019s government, culminating in her resignation and flight to India. The unrest left more than 1,000 people dead and dismantled a political order that was entrenched in Dhaka\u2019s politics for over a decade.Now, on February 12, Bangladesh votes in its first general election since that uprising, a ballot that will test not only the strength of its democracy but the direction of its national identity. Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus who took charge after Hasina\u2019s ouster said that the interim government \u201cwill hand over the responsibility to the newly elected government with deep pleasure and pride.\u201dBut the field has been radically reshaped. The once-dominant Awami League has been sidelined, opening the field to a resurgent Bangladesh Nationalist Party under Tarique Rahman and an emboldened Jamaat-e-Islami seeking renewed legitimacy.For Bangladesh, this is a struggle to restore stability after a stint with instability. But it also holds a significant impact on a region that has battled with growing instability, where governments have fallen and leaders have fled faster than Pakistan<\/a>\u2019s military has overturned governments.For India, China and Pakistan, it is a moment that could redraw the strategic balance in South Asia.<\/p>\n

How we got here
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In 2024 widespread student protests erupted over public sector job quotas, but quickly escalated into a nationwide revolt against the Hasina government. By early July, protesters clashed violently with police in Dhaka and other cities. The unrest peaked in early August when security forces opened fire on demonstrators. On 5 August 2024 the situation culminated in the resignation of Sheikh Hasina, who immediately left for India. Over 1,000 people were killed in the clashes \u2013 the deadliest violence Bangladesh has seen since its 1971 independence war. <\/p>\n

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\"Bangladesh<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

In the aftermath, a caretaker government was formed, headed by Nobel laureate Prof. Muhammad Yunus (best known for microfinance). This interim cabinet \u2013 comprising ex-bureaucrats, civil society figures and student leaders \u2013 took power in late August 2024. It promised to uphold order, prosecute crimes committed during the protests, and prepare for new elections. One of its first actions was to promulgate a provisional \u201cJuly Charter\u201d of reforms, advocating constitutional changes and term limits to curb executive power. A referendum on this charter is also being held alongside the election.By law the elections must be held by early 2026. Notably, the once-dominant Awami League (AL) was effectively excluded: the interim government has banned the AL in response to allegations of crimes during the protests. Instead, the race centers on the BNP-led opposition coalition (with Islamist allies) and several smaller groups including a new National Citizen Party (NCP) founded by student activists. Professor Harsh V. Pant, Vice President at the Observer Research Foundation, believes Bangladesh\u2019s election is unlikely to produce a sharp geopolitical pivot. Instead, he argues, pragmatism will prevail.\u201cBut the most likely outcome is that whoever comes to power in Bangladesh is likely to be pragmatic in its engagement with both India and China,\u201d Pant told The Times of India. In his assessment, it would be \u201cvery foolhardy of any government in Dhaka to take a one-sided view of the India\u2013China relationship or to tilt to one side or the other\u201d.Pant stressed that balancing both Asian powers is not merely diplomatic caution but strategic necessity. \u201cIt helps Bangladesh if they are engaged with both India and China,\u201d he said, adding that such engagement allows both countries to \u201chelp Bangladesh shore up its capabilities\u201d.<\/p>\n

Which are the key parties?
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A <\/span>BNP<\/span> under new leadership<\/span>The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) has been one of the two major parties in Bangladesh for decades. Founded by President Ziaur Rahman in the late 1970s, it has been led by his widow, Khaleda Zia, since 1984. Khaleda served three terms as prime minister (1991\u201396, 2001\u201306) and was a central figure in Bangladeshi politics. <\/p>\n

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Khaleda Zia\u2019s influence was immense, and even after years of legal troubles and house arrest in the late 2010s, she remained BNP\u2019s unchallenged leader. Her death in late December 2025 has now left a leadership vacuum. The party immediately chose her eldest son, Tarique Rahman, as acting chairman. Tarique had fled the country in 2007 amid corruption charges, and for nearly 18 years lived in exile in London. His surprise return on 25 December 2025 was a dramatic moment: thousands of BNP supporters greeted him, and he has positioned himself as the torchbearer of his mother\u2019s political legacy. BNP sources say Tarique will formally assume party leadership to guide the BNP into the poll.Tarique Rahman\u2019s re-entry greatly energised the BNP base. He is widely expected to be the party\u2019s prime ministerial candidate if the alliance wins a majority. In his very first campaign speeches, Tarique struck themes of national pride and stability: he criticized Islamist rivals for exploiting religion, and vowed to \u201cuphold national sovereignty and work for women and young people\u201d. Supporters wearing BNP\u2019s yellow and green flocked to see him, chanting slogans of independence and democratic change. <\/p>\n

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The BNP\u2019s weaknesses have also become apparent. Khaleda\u2019s long illness had largely kept her out of politics since 2018, and the party\u2019s cadres have suffered under AL crackdowns in recent years. Its alliance building is fragile: Jamaat-e-Islami (to be discussed below) is a key ally, but other Islamist groups have even broken away from Jamaat\u2019s alliance over seat disputes. Nonetheless, with the AL absent, Tarique\u2019s return has put BNP in the front seat for power. Indian officials have already moved to engage with the new BNP leadership: at Khaleda\u2019s December funeral, EAM Jaishankar delivered PM Modi\u2019s condolence letter to Tarique and \u201cexpressed optimism about strengthening bilateral relations following Bangladesh\u2019s democratic transition\u201d. <\/p>\n

Jamaat-e-Islami\u2019s resurgence
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Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) is Bangladesh\u2019s largest Islamist party. It was banned from elections and effectively outlawed after 2013, when courts ruled its charter violated the secular constitution. Many Jamaat leaders had been convicted for war crimes in the 1971 Liberation War, due to the party\u2019s support for Pakistan during that conflict. For over a decade under Awami League rule, the Jamaat was excluded from politics.That changed in mid-2025. On June 1, 2025, Bangladesh\u2019s Supreme Court restored Jamaat\u2019s registration. This landmark decision came as the interim government promised inclusive polls. The court lifted Jamaat\u2019s election ban and overturned the conviction of one of its leaders, paving the way for its participation in the 2026 elections. Legal observers said the ruling allowed a \u201cmore democratic, inclusive and multiparty system\u201d. With Jamaat back in play, the Islamist party formally launched an electoral alliance. It teamed up with ten other parties (including the Gen-Z-led National Citizen Party) to contest seats under a single banner. <\/p>\n

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\"Jamaat's<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

Jamaat\u2019s platform is rooted in Islamic principles, but the party has visibly rebranded itself for 2026. Party leader Dr. Shafiqur Rahman has emphasized social welfare and anti-corruption measures, steering away from its former hard-line image. He told Reuters that Jamaat\u2019s focus is now on \u201cwelfare politics, not reactionary politics,\u201d highlighting its medical camps, flood relief and aid for protest victims as examples of a constructive agenda. <\/p>\n

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Indeed, Jamaat has reached out to demographics it once ignored: Reuters notes that for the first time Jamaat fielded a Hindu candidate for parliament and publicly condemned recent attacks on minorities.On Jamaat-e-Islami\u2019s growing influence, Professor Pant offered a more cautious assessment. \u201cJamaat\u2019s influence has been growing. The Islamist forces have been growing in Bangladesh,\u201d he said, describing that trend as \u201ca cause for worry\u201d. If Jamaat gains greater sway, \u201cthere is certainly a likelihood that Pakistan can re-enter Bangladesh strategically\u201d.However, he emphasised that history places limits on Islamabad\u2019s ambitions. \u201cHistory is an important marker and it is not that easy for Pakistan to re-establish its credentials in Bangladesh,\u201d he said.Pant also noted that Islamist mobilisation has not gone unchallenged. \u201cWe have seen that there remains a strong pushback against the extremist factions in Bangladeshi society,\u201d he said.<\/p>\n

NCP: Gen Z party faces defining test
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The National Citizen Party (NCP) was born out of the blood and fury of July 2024. The student portest propelled a new generation of activists into formal politics. Formed in early 2025 and led by 27-year-old Nahid Islam, the NCP says it aims to break decades of dominance by the Awami League and the BNP. Its platform centres on tackling corruption, ensuring judicial independence, protecting press freedom and reforming governance through the so-called July Charter. The party has also pledged justice for those killed in the uprising, lowering the voting age to 16, job creation through economic reform and greater women\u2019s representation in parliament.Yet translating street power into votes has proved difficult. Opinion polls ahead of the February 12, election suggest the NCP trails behind the BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami. Lacking funds and grassroots machinery, the party struck an electoral alliance with Jamaat in December, describing it as a \u201cstrategic\u201d and not ideological pact designed to prevent instability and electoral sabotage.The move has triggered internal revolt. At least 30 senior figures have opposed the alliance, with several resigning. Critics argue the partnership risks diluting the NCP\u2019s centrist identity and tethering it to Jamaat\u2019s controversial past. The deal has also raised concerns over women\u2019s representation, with only a handful of female candidates fielded under the arrangement.<\/p>\n

Why is the region watching closely
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What’s the outlook for India?<\/span>Bangladesh\u2019s ties with India have long oscillated with domestic politics. Under Khaleda Zia\u2019s BNP governments (1991\u201396 and 2001\u201306), relations were often tense. Khaleda herself famously positioned the BNP as a \u201cprotector of Bangladeshi interests against Indian domination,\u201d raising issues like overland transit rights, the 1972 Friendship Treaty, and disputes over the Farakka Barrage on the Ganges. She refused to grant India unfettered transit of goods through Bangladeshi territory, calling it a threat to Bangladesh\u2019s sovereignty. Khaleda\u2019s alliance with Jamaat exacerbated those frictions. In the early 2000s Jamaat elements in Bangladesh harbored extremists hostile to India. Khaleda\u2019s rival Sheikh Hasina \u2013 leader of the secular Awami League \u2013 worked closely with India. Hasina\u2019s governments from 2009 onward cracked down on anti-India militants (including Jamaat-linked cells) and resolved various disputes.In the 1970s\u201380s Jamaat was pro-Pakistan and opposed to Bangladeshi independence. <\/p>\n

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However, Jamaat\u2019s current leadership is publicly moderating its tone. In private, the party has sought dialogue with India: Reuters reports that Jamaat leader Shafiqur Rahman even met an Indian diplomat (confidentially) earlier in 2025 and said Bangladesh must \u201cbecome open to each other\u201d. At the same time, Shafiqur has voiced irritation that Hasina \u201ccontinues to stay in India\u201d after fleeing. This reflects the interim government\u2019s hard line: Bangladeshi leaders have asked India to extradite Hasina for trial, and New Delhi has demurred.In its election manifesto, Jamaat declares it will seek \u201cpeaceful and cooperative relations\u201d with all neighbours, including India. Whether this rhetoric will hold in practice is uncertain, but it suggests Jamaat knows India is a critical audience.From India\u2019s standpoint, Pant suggested that \u201cthe best case scenario\u201d would be a mainstream party such as the BNP winning the election, \u201cnow that Awami League is out of contention\u201d, with Jamaat\u2019s role \u201ccontained and limited\u201d rather than decisive. Post-2024 strains<\/span>The revolutionary upheaval that removed Hasina has strained relations with India. Hasina was seen in New Delhi as a reliable ally, and her abrupt ouster took Dhaka into a period of uncertainty. The interim government has been openly critical of India\u2019s hospitality to Hasina. Yunus\u2019s advisers complained that India allowed \u201cincendiary\u201d remarks from Hasina\u2019s exile to go unpunished, and even that Yunus\u2019s first official visit was to China \u2013 Bangladesh\u2019s traditional rival of India. In April 2025 Prime Minister Modi met Yunus in Thailand, declaring a desire for \u201cpositive and constructive\u201d ties, but also taking the opportunity to raise concerns about alleged \u201catrocities\u201d against minorities in Bangladesh.Indeed, since late 2024 there have been multiple attacks on Bangladesh\u2019s Hindu minority, often linked to the political turmoil. Hindus (about 8% of the population) historically tended to support the Awami League; after Hasina\u2019s fall, mobs in several districts burned homes and temples belonging to Hindus. Why it matters for India<\/span>For New Delhi, Bangladesh is far more than a neighbour; it is a strategic linchpin in south Asia\u2019s evolving geopolitical architecture. The two countries share a 4,000km border, deep economic ties, and common concerns. Historically, India has tried to maintain good relations regardless of which Bangladeshi party was in power. As PM Modi\u2019s handover letter at Khaleda\u2019s funeral made clear, India expects Bangladesh\u2019s \u201cvision and values\u201d \u2013 whether from Khaleda or others \u2013 to guide partnership building. On Dec 31, 2025, Jaishankar met Tarique Rahman and handed over PM Modi\u2019s condolences, while earlier in April 2025, PM Modi met Yunus, pledging cooperation. Such meetings signal that India will work with the incoming government.A central strategic theme for India has been connectivity with its own north eastern states. The Siliguri Corridor, a narrow stretch of land in West Bengal commonly known as the \u201cChicken\u2019s Neck,\u201d (something that interim governments leader\u2019s have alluded to much to India\u2019s anger) remains a cause for India\u2019s territorial cohesion because it is the sole land link to the eight north eastern states. New Delhi has invested in alternative logistics and security measures, including a plan for an underground railway line to strengthen this corridor against natural or geopolitical disruption. These infrastructure plans reflect India\u2019s heightened awareness that reducing dependence on this bottleneck is a long-term priority. Access to Bangladeshi ports also intersects with India\u2019s broader Act East Policy, which aims to link India\u2019s north east with Southeast Asian markets. Ongoing infrastructure cooperation, such as expanded rail and road links across the border, has been encouraged in diplomatic dialogues, signalling that New Delhi views Dhaka not just as a neighbour, but as a partner in regional integration. These connectivity and security interests intersect with regional power competition. China has significantly expanded its influence in Bangladesh, particularly since the political transition in 2024, through infrastructure projects, diplomatic engagement and investment. Beijing\u2019s involvement ranges from port facilities to broader development financing. Domestic political shifts in Dhaka have also strained diplomatic engagement. Earlier diplomatic frictions, including reduced issuance of medical visas by India, inadvertently created space that Beijing sought to fill with offers of infrastructure and hospital projects. Water and river diplomacy also remain perennial strategic issues. Shared rivers like the Teesta have long been part of bilateral discussions, with water sharing agreements seen as symbolic of deeper cooperation. Progress on these fronts will continue to be important irrespective of the electoral outcome. <\/p>\n

What are the stakes for Pakistan and China?
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Beyond ideology and geopolitics, both Pakistan and China are sensitive to economic fallout in Bangladesh. The garment sector, the backbone of Bangladesh\u2019s export economy, remains fragile after tariffs and instability dented orders and investor confidence. A government that cannot reassure buyers, or that imposes policies that unsettle factory owners and foreign investors, will cascade economic pain through the region: lower exports, supply-chain disruption and slower regional growth. That would be bad for China (which trades and invests heavily in the region) and for Pakistan (which looks to Bangladesh as a market and a partner in regional forums). Stability and rules-based governance thus serve both capitals\u2019 material interests. If Jamaat gains ground<\/span>For Pakistan, Jamaat\u2019s rise would carry symbolic weight. The party\u2019s historical links to Islamist politics in the subcontinent, and its controversial position during the 1971 Liberation War, have long shaped how it is viewed in Dhaka and Islamabad. A stronger Jamaat presence in government could open warmer political channels between Bangladesh and Pakistan, potentially softening decades of distrust.Islamabad would see opportunities for diplomatic re-engagement, expanded religious and educational exchanges, and closer coordination in multilateral forums such as the OIC. Even incremental thawing would be framed domestically in Pakistan as a geopolitical correction in South Asia.Yet the gains would be more symbolic than structural. Bangladesh\u2019s economy is deeply intertwined with global supply chains and regional powers beyond Pakistan. Any government in Dhaka must prioritise export markets and macroeconomic stability over ideological affinity. Pakistan\u2019s room to convert goodwill into concrete economic advantage would remain limited.For China, Jamaat\u2019s rise presents a more complex equation. Beijing\u2019s interests in Bangladesh are overwhelmingly economic and strategic: infrastructure, energy, digital networks and maritime access linked to the Belt and Road Initiative. China has become one of Bangladesh\u2019s largest trading partners and a key financier of major projects.A Jamaat-influenced administration might not necessarily disrupt these ties. In fact, Islamist parties have often shown pragmatic streaks in foreign policy when economic survival is at stake. If the BNP wins<\/span>A clear BNP victory alters the dynamic in subtler ways. The party, historically led by the Zia family, has long advocated a nationalist, sovereignty-focused platform. It has at times been critical of what it describes as overdependence on India. That posture could indirectly benefit Pakistan, as a Dhaka less closely aligned with New Delhi might reopen space for Islamabad to rebuild ties.However, BNP leaders have also signalled an interest in diversifying partnerships rather than pivoting wholesale towards any one country. For Pakistan, this means cautious optimism rather than guaranteed alignment. Diplomatic warmth may improve, trade delegations may resume, and symbolic gestures could follow. But deep strategic convergence is far from certain.Economically, Bangladesh\u2019s trade with Pakistan remains modest compared to its commerce with China, India, the EU and the US. But symbolism cannot override economics. Pakistan remains a marginal trade partner compared to China, India and the WestChina\u2019s calculus under a BNP government is more consequential. The BNP has previously engaged closely with Beijing, and China has cultivated ties across Bangladesh\u2019s political spectrum to safeguard its investments. A BNP-led administration would likely continue major infrastructure projects while possibly seeking better financial terms or greater transparency to address domestic criticism.The challenge for Beijing could arise if a BNP government attempts a recalibration of foreign policy to balance China more visibly with Western partners. Efforts to court European or American investment, or to diversify defence procurement, might slightly dilute China\u2019s relative influence. Yet this would represent adjustment rather than rupture.What are the economic implications<\/span>Whichever party prevails, Bangladesh\u2019s economic health will shape the regional equation. The country\u2019s export-driven model, centred on garments, depends on stability, investor trust and access to Western markets. Prolonged unrest or policy uncertainty would dampen growth and affect regional trade flows.For China, Bangladesh is a gateway to the eastern Indian Ocean and a critical node in regional connectivity. For Pakistan, improved ties with Dhaka would signal diplomatic breathing space in South Asia. But neither capital can override Bangladesh\u2019s domestic priorities: jobs, inflation control and social stability.In many ways, this election is less about ideological realignment and more about governance credibility. Pakistan may hope for renewed warmth if Jamaat gains or if the BNP distances itself from India. China will look for guarantees that its billions in infrastructure commitments remain insulated from political swings.<\/p>\n

So, what does the future hold?
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Bangladesh\u2019s February 12 election is not simply a transfer of power; it is a reckoning with the political order that has defined the country for nearly two decades. The uprising of 2024 shattered the dominance of one party, but it did not resolve the deeper questions about identity, governance and the balance between secular nationalism and political Islam. Those questions now sit at the heart of the ballot.For the BNP, this is a bid for restoration under Tarique Rahman. For Jamaat-e-Islami, it is a quest for renewed legitimacy after years in the wilderness. For voters, it is a choice about stability, ideology and the limits of executive power.Beyond Bangladesh\u2019s borders, the implications are strategic. India will seek continuity and security, China will guard its investments, and Pakistan will watch for diplomatic openings. The outcome will not simply decide a government. It will signal which direction a pivotal South Asian state chooses at a moment of regional uncertainty.But ultimately, this election will reveal something more fundamental: whether Bangladesh emerges from the crisis with a clearer democratic centre, or whether fragmentation and competitive nationalism become its defining features. In a region already unsettled by political churn, the direction Dhaka chooses will resonate far beyond its borders.<\/div>\n\n

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